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Abstract
We examine the relation between bureaucratic corruption and firm performance in CEE
countries. We show that divergent consequences of corruption found in previous studies can
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higher mean bribery is associated with lower firm performance, while higher dispersion of
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21. Introduction
In countries with weak policies and legal systems corruption is considered a strong
constraint on growth and development. The existing literature on the effects of corruption
on firm performance is, however, divided. One branch considers corruption a grease the
wheels instrument that helps overcome cumbersome bureaucratic constraints, inefficient
provision of public services, and rigid laws (Huntington, 1968; Lui, 1985; Lein, 1986),
especially when countries institutions are weak and function poorly (Acemoglu and
Verdier, 2000; Meon and Weill, 2010; De Vaal and Ebben, 2011). Another branch argues
that corruption reduces economic performance due to rent seeking, increase of transaction
costs and uncertainty, inefficient investments, and misallocation of production factors
(Murphy et al., 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Kaufmann and
Wei, 2000). Empirical evidence at the firm-level is also ambiguous: some papers find that
bribery is harmful (McArthur and Teal, 2004; Fisman and Svensson, 2007; De Rosa et al.,
2015), while others find a positive effect (Vial and Hanoteau, 2010). Overall the evidence
remains scarce due to the lack of available data.
In this paper we contribute to the firm-level empirical research on bureaucratic
corruption and firm performance, and explain the divergent effects of corruption found in
previous studies. We employ a rich firm-level panel dataset with a widely-accepted measure
of bureaucratic corruption (bribery) that allows us to alleviate some of the methodological
concerns of existing research. We focus on a group of countries from Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE), as they have a similar history of transition to a market economy, but are still
institutionally diverse.
Our approach is to combine the information on firm bribery practices, measured as
the frequency of bribing public officials to get things done, from BEEPS
1
and firm
1
BEEPS ( Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey) is a part of the global WBES
(World Bank Enterprise Survey)
3financial data from the Amadeus database. This gives us a large firm-level panel data for 14
CEE, which have more accurate and detailed information on firms economic activity and
bribery than BEEPS alone. Previous studies that use firm bribery practices and performance
from anonymous surveys such as BEEPS or WBES suffer from missing data, as firms are
often reluctant to reveal their financial records (Gaviria, 2002; McArthur and Teal, 2004;
Fisman and Svensson 2007; De Rosa et al., 2015).
2
Those studies also deal with cross-
sectional data, while we are able to exploit the panel structure of our dataset. In the
regression analysis we control for firm fixed effects, which eliminate time-invariant factors
that could simultaneously cause bribery, and firm performance. This is an important step to
diminish the endogeneity of the bribery measure, given the recognized difficulties in finding
exogenous variation to explain corruption.
To combine two datasets we introduce local bribery environments. We define
local markets, in which firms operate, as clusters jointly formed by survey wave, country,
double-digit industry, firm size, and location size. This is relevant, since bureaucratic
corruption might be a local phenomenon that depends not only on country, but industry,
firm and markets size. We then analyze how the local bribery environments 
characterized by the means and dispersions of individual firm bribes  influence the
economic performance of firms. We compute the mean and standard deviation of the
bribery measure from BEEPS for all local markets. For firms from Amadeus we can also
identify those markets, and thereby each firm is assigned characteristics of the local bribery
environment. Economically, the bribery mean approximates the equilibrium level of bribery
in a local market. The bribery dispersion, meanwhile, represents the pervasiveness of
bureaucratic corruption, and the availability of opportunities for some firms to extract
benefits from bribery.
2
For example, in the widely-used BEEPS and WBES databases about 40 to 50% of firms do not report their
performance indicators.
4The use of the notion of local bribery environments is another step to reduce the
endogeneity of bribery measures, since an individual firms performance less likely affects
the bribery environment than its own bribing behavior. The joint use of two independent
data sources also alleviates this concern, because different firms report financial statements
and bribery. Our approach thus provides more accurate estimates of the effect of bribery on
firm performance than those obtained from previous studies.
Similar to many papers (Gaviria, 2002; Beck et al., 2005; Fisman and Svensson,
2007; Vial and Hanoteau, 2010) we measure firms performance as sales and labor
productivity growth of firms, as these enhance wealth and employment creation, and
stimulate economic development. The results of the empirical analysis, identified from
within-firm variation, show that the ambiguous consequences of corruption found in
previous studies can be explained by the different effects of the mean and dispersion of
bureaucratic corruption in the local environment. In particular, a higher bribery mean
impedes both the real sales and the labor productivity growth of firms. This is generally
consistent with the existing firm- and macro-level empirical research. In contrast, a higher
dispersion of individual firm bribes facilitates firm performance. Moreover, firms are more
likely to increase their growth rates in the environments with both a higher bribery mean
and higher dispersion. We also find that these impacts are more pronounced in the case of
labor productivity growth. These results are robust to various specification checks.
Our results suggest that in more dispersed local bribery environments at least some
firms that bribe receive preferential treatments from public officials, and non-bribing firms
are likely to be efficient in production and growth. The existence of a certain number of
bribing firms in a local market, therefore, stimulates aggregate firm performance. This
finding is in line with Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), as positive effects from bribery
dispersion can overshoot negative effects from the bribery mean. The chance to receive
benefits from bribery for particular firms may be one reason why corruption does not
5vanish, in spite of its overall growth restraining effect (Mauro, 1995; Aidt et al., 2009). In
addition, we find that our results vary for different types of firms. Smaller firms are least
affected by bribery, while service firms are able to gain most in environments with higher
corruption dispersion. We also observe that in countries with stronger institutions, the
effects of bribery mean and dispersion are more pronounced.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the notion of
local bribery environments and discusses its relation to firm performance. Section 3
describes the data and explains the merging of the financial information and the bribery
practices of firms. Section 4 outlines the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the
results and robustness checks, and section 6 concludes.
2. Local Bribery Environments and Firm Performance
The institutional environment of a country largely determines its level of economic
development, overall corruption, and the behavior and performance of firms (Acemoglu,
2003). However, a country may consist of many narrow local markets that can be
heterogeneous with respect to economic conditions as well as bribery practices. A small
furniture company located in a rural area, for instance, may face a different demand for, and
provide a different supply of bribes than a large retail firm located in a capital city.
In this paper we focus on local markets that are comprised of firms sharing a similar
size, area of economic activity (industry), and location size. We characterize these local
markets by the levels of bribery mean and dispersion of individual firm bribes, which we
term the local bribery environments.
3
The bribery mean can be viewed as an equilibrium
level of corruption in a local market, defined by the demand from public officials and
3
The notion of the local bribery environment is aligned with the arguments of Svensson (2003) and Fisman
and Svensson (2007) that bribery is industry- and region-specific. They suggest that a firm depends more on
public officials, and therefore might have to pay higher bribes (or pay bribes more often) if it requires more
permits and licenses due to specifics of its economic activity or location. Del Monte and Papagni (2007) and
Ledyaeva et al. (2013) demonstrate the variation of corruption across regions in Italy and in Russia,
respectively. However, it is unlikely that all firms in a local market always bribe equally.
6supply by firms. Bribery dispersion reflects firms willingness to bribe (Bliss and Tella,
1997; Svensson, 2003; Luo and Han, 2008), the discretionary power of public officials and
uncertainty in a local market. We outline possible links between firm growth and local
bribery environments below.
Higher bribes or frequency of bribing can alter firms incentives to grow, such that
they prefer to remain small and less visible to public officials (Gauthier and Goyette, 2014).
Bribery can also restrain firms from obtaining licenses and permissions, which undermines
innovations and investment (OToole and Tarp, 2014), and can limit exporting and
importing activities essential for firm growth. In the same vein, if public officials demand
bribes repetitively, firms may chose inefficient technology and lower investments, as Choi
and Thum (2004) show. Bribery can also cause longer delays in public services provision,
and thereby project interruptions, if bureaucrats tend to increase red tape in order to extract
more bribes (Kaufmann and Wei, 2000). Finally, higher bribes can provoke reallocation of
talent from production to rent-seeking (Murphy et al., 1991, Dal Bo and Rossi, 2007). In
this case, one would expect a negative relationship between bribery mean and firm
performance. Some empirical research finds either an insignificant or negative impact of
bribery on the sales growth or productivity of firms (for example, Gaviria, 2002; McArthur
and Teal, 2004; Fisman and Svensson, 2007). For CEE and the former Soviet Union
countries, De Rosa et al. (2015) show that bribery more negatively affects firm productivity
in non-EU countries and in those with weaker institutions.
However, if bribery works as a grease the wheels instrument, it can help overcome
some bureaucratic constraints and inefficient public services provision. This would create a
positive relationship between bribery mean and firm performance (Huntington, 1968; Lui,
1985; Lein, 1986; and Vial and Hanoteau, 2010, present empirical evidence for Indonesia).
The relationship between dispersion of individual firm bribes and firm performance
is less straightforward. Given a positive level of bribery mean, in an environment with low
7bribery dispersion, all firms bribe in the same way. Corruption is pervasive and can be seen
as a tax or an additional fee for public services provision. This should not create distortions
other than those connected to the bribery mean.
In an environment with higher bribery dispersion the variation of frequency of
bribing is high. This possibility is well documented in the empirical literature (e.g.,
Svensson, 2003; Luo and Han, 2008). However, theoretical research does not provide clear
guidance on the effects of bribery dispersion on firm performance. We thus highlight a few
outcomes.
In order for higher bribery dispersion to facilitate joint firm performance in a local
market, bribery should benefit all, or the majority of bribing firms. This situation could
happen when bribing firms are able to exploit favorable opportunities from bribery, and are
efficient in giving bribes. At the same time public officials are able to discriminate between
firms to extract more bribes in a local market.
4
Non-bribing firms must be efficient in
complying with bureaucratic regulations, and benefit from better allocation of their
production recourses, as otherwise bribing firms would crowd out those that do not bribe.
5
This does not imply, however, that bribing firms must always be less efficient in production.
Such an outcome would be in line with Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), showing that when
the government intervenes to correct market failures, a small amount of corruption may
exist as part of an optimal allocation of resources. Infante and Smirnova (2009) demonstrate
that in weaker institutional environments, rent-seeking bureaucrats can help improve the
productivity of entrepreneurs. Similarly, De Vaal and Ebben (2011) suggest that when the
initial quality of institutions is below a certain threshold, bureaucratic corruption facilitates
economic performance, as it takes on the role of institutions. These papers, however, discuss
4
Diaby and Sylwester (2014), for instance, show that bribes are higher when bureaucracy is decentralized.
5
Hanousek and Palda (2009), for example, find that in an uneven environment, efficient non-tax-evading firms
are crowded out by inefficient tax-evading firms.
8beneficial effects of corruption for social welfare, while we focus on the effects for
aggregate firm performance in local markets.
In contrast, if bribery helps only a minority of bribing firms, creates negative
externalities (Kaufmann and Wei, 2000), and does not incentivize non-bribing firms to
perform better, then in a more dispersed local bribery environment firm performance can
deteriorate. This could happen, for example, when public officials target the most
productive firms, which in response degrade their technology and investment (Choi and
Thum, 2004). Such an outcome is in line with Mauro (1995), Aidt et al. (2009) and OToole
and Tarp, (2014).
Finally, a higher bribery dispersion can be perceived as a higher uncertainty in a
local market, which can lead to negative outcomes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Choi and
Thum, 2004). Given the disagreement on the effects of bribery on firm performance in the
literature, and missing theoretical predictions regarding the possible impact of bribery
dispersion, we have a strong incentive to analyze the relationship between the characteristics
of the local bribery environment and firm performance.
6
In the next section we describe our
data, the definitions of local bribery environments and other variables, prior to empirical
analysis.
3. Data
3.1. Data Sources
The bribery measure is taken from BEEPS, an anonymous survey of a stratified random
sample of firms from CEE and former Soviet Union countries.
7
It consists of a rich set of
questions about firms activity, market orientation, financial performance and employment,
6
The analysis of the specific channels through which bribery can impact firm growth is, however, beyond the
scope of this paper.
7
BEEPS is collected jointly by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
The data are available online at https://www.enterprisesurveys.org and at http://ebrd-beeps.com/data/. Data
for this paper was downloaded from the first source.
9as well as infrastructural, criminal, corruption and legal environments. A disadvantage of
BEEPS is missing data for questions related to accounting information (4050% missing
data on sales, assets, costs, etc.), which can imply a biased inference from the data analysis.
For instance, the worst-performing firms may not report their accounting information and
complain more about corruption (Jensen et al., 2010). Each wave of BEEPS covers the three
preceding years; we use the three waves completed in 2002, 2005, and 2008.
The financial data comes from the Amadeus database. It contains detailed balance
sheet and income statement data, as well as industry codes and the exact identification of
European firms.
8
Because non-active (unresponsive or exiting from the market) firms are
excluded from the database after a certain period, we have merged several editions of
Amadeus (2003, 2007, and 2010).
For the analysis we chose 14 CEE countries that are well covered in both Amadeus
and BEEPS: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. These countries are
similar in that they started the transition to a market economy at approximately the same
time. They are, however, quite different in overall corruption levels, as Figure A.1 in
Appendix A shows for the Control of Corruption indicator from the Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI) database compiled by the World Bank.
Both the BEEPS and Amadeus databases tend to understate very small firms, and
Amadeus tends to overstate large firms (Klapper et al., 2006). In addition, during data
cleaning of Amadeus we removed firms with less than two employees that potentially could
have been created for purposes of tax evasion (Klapper et al., 2006).
9
Due to these facts, we
conduct analysis for different subsamples of firms, in particular, for firms of different sizes
and industrial sectors.
8
Details about the Amadeus database can be found at http://www.bvdep.com.
9
The data cleaning procedure as well as a detailed comparison of firm distributions in BEEPS and Amadeus
with the whole population of firms retrieved from OECD.STAN for eight OECD countries is available in the
Online Appendix.
10
3.2. Combining Information from the BEEPS and Amadeus Databases
The joint use of the BEEPS and Amadeus databases provides a good opportunity to study
the effects of local bribery environments on firm performance. To combine bribery practices
with firm financial information we define clusters that represent local markets, using the
following criteria: i. country; ii. time period (19992001, 20022004, and 20052007,
corresponding to the waves of BEEPS); iii. industry (two-digit ISIC rev 3.1 industry code),
4) firm size (micro firms with 210 employees, small firms with 1149 employees, and
medium and large firms with more than 50 employees); and iv. location size (capital, city
with population above 1 million, and city with population below 1 million). A resulting
cluster combines all criteria: country, time, industry, firm size and location size.
10
It is straightforward to identify clusters in both databases. In both BEEPS and
Amadeus firms report industry and employment data. In BEEPS firms record the size of
location. In Amadeus firms report the address of registration, which we use to identify
capitals and cities with a population above 1 million (these are only in Russia and Ukraine)
to construct a location size variable.
The criteria defining clusters explain 40% of the total variation of the bribery
measure in BEEPS.
11
We require each cluster to have at least 4 firms, which reduces sample
size to 10,097 firms (67% of the original sample), available for use in BEEPS, and we
obtain 1,137 clusters in total. The average number of firms in a cluster is 8.87 and the
median is 6. For each cluster we compute the mean and standard deviation of individual
firm bribes and assign them to every firm in the Amadeus database operating in the same
10
We cannot utilize regions in the criteria defining local markets, as would be in accordance with Svensson
(2003) and Fisman and Svensson (2007), since regions are not consistently defined in BEEPS. In the
robustness check, therefore, we show that the results of this study remain the same for the subsample of
firms located in the capital cities only and for the case when size of location is omitted from the criteria
defining clusters.
11
This result is R2 obtained from the analysis-of-variance (ANOVA) with the bribery measure as a
dependent variable and all interactions between country, year, industry, firm size, and location size as
independent variables.
11
cluster. Given the structure of the data, the mean and standard deviation of the bribery
measure are a good way to describe the bureaucratic corruption environment in the local
market. They represent an equilibrium bribery level and the dispersion of individual firm
bribes.
12
The initial sample size available for use in Amadeus is around 1,450,000. When
combining two datasets, only two clusters computed using BEEPS have no counterparts in
Amadeus. About 48% of observations from Amadeus got assigned characteristics of the
local bribery environments,
13
which yields around 700,000 firm-year observations useful for
analysis.
Our final dataset results in unbalanced firm-level panel data for 19992007 where
the bribery measures vary across clusters and remain constant over three-year periods. For
the regression analysis we reduce the time span to three time periods to match the variation
of bribery measures. Besides the availability of high quality firm-level financial data, the
advantage of our dataset is the alleviation of the endogeneity between firm performance and
bribery, which we discuss in detail in Section 4. Another advantage is the reduction of
measurement error and firm-specific perceptions (due to managers optimism or pessimism)
in the bribery mean measure, by averaging them out.
12
Anos-Casero and Udomsaph (2009) and Commander and Svejnar (2011) also attempt to combine two
datasets using the 2002 and 2005 waves of BEEPS for 7  8 CEE countries. Our main departure from these
papers is that we separate micro firms with fewer than 10 employees from small firms with 11-49 employees.
This is motivated by the fact that originally nearly 45% of firms in BEEPS and 40% of firms in Amadeus are
micro firms. Clearly, micro firms might be exempted from some bureaucratic regulations and taxes (World
Bank, 2004; European Commission, 2011), and consequently they may encounter demands from public
officials less often. Anos-Casero and Udomsaph (2009) and Commander and Svejnar (2011) study how
business constraints impact TFP and efficiency to generate revenue. A recent paper by Fungacova et al. (2015)
uses exactly the same criteria in defining clusters as we do. It studies whether bribery affects firm-level bank
debt. None of these papers, however, examine the dispersion of individual firm bribes or business constraints
within clusters.
13
48% of observations from Amadeus merged with BEEPS is a large number, since a complete number of
clusters in the roster would be 8100=14(country)*3(wave)*2(3 for Russia and Ukraine, location size)*3(firm
size)*30(industry). But because BEEPS does not cover all firms, industries, etc. combinations, and we
disregard clusters with less than 4 firms, we have only 1,137 clusters (14%).
Additional summary statistics are available in the Online Appendix. For example, after merging, around half
of the sample belongs to Russia and Ukraine, while in BEEPS these countries represent only 30%. This
redistribution across countries, however, does not affect our results, as we show in the robustness check.
12
3.3. Definitions of Variables
The bribery measure is obtained from answers to the following BEEPS question:
Thinking about officials, would you say the following statement is always, usually,
frequently, sometimes, seldom, or never true: It is common for firms in my line of business
to have to pay some irregular additional payments/gifts to get things done with regard to
customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, etc.?
14
Amongst the questions about corruption, this one is the most neutral, and virtually
the only one that occurs consistently across all three waves. The variable is categorical and
takes values from 1 to 6. Higher values stand for higher frequency of bribing. For
convenience we rescale it to a variable that varies from 0 to 1 by subtracting 1 from the
original value and dividing the result by 5. Figure A.2 in Appendix A offers a country-time
variation of this measure. It is heterogeneous across countries and decreases overall with
time.
The dependent and control firm-level variables come from the Amadeus dataset. For
performance variables we consider real sales growth and real labor productivity growth, as
used in previous studies (Gaviria, 2002; Beck et al., 2005; Fisman and Svensson, 2007; Vial
and Hanoteau, 2010).
15
Real sales are approximated by the firm operational revenue in 2000
prices, and labor productivity is real sales per employee. We take the first differences of the
logarithms of these measures to derive yearly growth rates. Further, we average these
growth rates over three-year periods in order to match the variation of bribery mean and
dispersion. Essentially, we moved from the nine-year time span to the three-period time
span for the regression analysis.
14
The framing in my line of business or typical firm like yours is a common approach to provide more
confidence to respondents and at the same time to elicit their own experience.
15
We do not measure productivity as TFP (total factor productivity) or value-added per employee, because
Amadeus has many missing values in the intermediate material and staff cost variables for CEE countries;
Russia, Latvia, and Lithuania do not report them at all. We use a simplified version of productivity that allows
firms capital and intermediate costs to be flexible.
13
We expect that a local bribery environment may have somewhat different effects on
these performance measures. We opt for the analysis of sales, as company turnover is not
directly affected by corporate income taxes and transfers. On the other hand, labor
productivity should reflect changes in employment structure, and therefore reveal firm
performance potential in a longer horizon. The dynamics of these firm characteristics are
important for development as they enhance economic welfare and employment creation.
For controls we employ the usual set of variables used in the firm-level financial
studies. To proxy firm size we use the logarithms of total assets and number of employees,
as well as their squares, to control for possible non-linearity.
16
Market share is the ratio of
sales of a firm to total sales in an industry defined at the four-digit level. Firm profitability is
defined as EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) over total assets. Leverage equates to
book leverage ratio  total debt over total assets, and cash flow is the reported cash flow
scaled by total assets. All control variables are from 1999, 2002, and 2005 to control for
initial conditions, as we move to the three-period panel data.
Our control variables can correlate with bribery measures and reduce the omitted-
variable bias. Firms with lower market shares, for instance, can be more engaged in bribery
in order to survive on the market. Luo and Han (2008) report such a correlation in a study of
the determinants of bribery and graft using WBES for several developing countries. More
profitable firms may have a higher willingness to pay and can pay larger bribes and/or more
frequently (Bliss and Tella, 1997; Svensson, 2003). Firm leverage can also correlate with
bribery if unofficial payments are needed to obtain external financing (Beck et al., 2005;
Fungacova et al., 2015). The availability of cash can also open greater opportunities for
bribe payments. In addition, the control variables restrict the sample to those firms that
report all essential financial information, making it more homogeneous across countries.
16
Inclusion of initial levels of sales or labor productivity, as well as their squares, in addition to or instead of
initial levels of total assets and employment does not change our main results. These additional results are
available upon request.
14
Finally, to proxy for the strength of country-level institutions, we use the rule of law
indicator, which we obtain from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) database
compiled by the World Bank. We rescale this indicator to a variable that ranges from 0 to 1,
where higher values stand for a stronger rule of law. Appendix B details definitions of all
employed variables. Summary statistics of variables and their pairwise correlations are in
Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean Median SD Min Max
Sales growth 0.05 0.04 0.52 -3.92 4.53
Productivity growth -0.03 -0.03 0.47 -3.58 4.55
Total Assets 4.14 4.05 2.04 -4.14 14.75
Employees 2.61 2.40 1.36 0.18 11.34
Profitability 0.11 0.07 0.33 -5.96 33.71
Market Share 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00
Leverage 0.67 0.67 0.47 0.00 24.83
Cash Flow 0.06 0.03 0.36 -16.81 137.31
Bribery Mean 0.30 0.29 0.14 0.00 0.80
Bribery Dispersion 0.27 0.28 0.09 0.00 0.58
Rule of Law 0.32 0.17 0.26 0.00 1.00
Note: The Table reports summary statistics of all used variables. The definitions of the variables are in the text
and Appendix B. Number of observations is 678,381, non-missing for all variables.
Table 2: Pairwise correlations
1 2 3 4 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Sales growth
2 Productivity growth 0.60 a
3 Total Assets -0.03 a 0.04 a
4 Employees -0.08 a 0.07 a 0.67 a
7 Profitability 0.04 a -0.02 a -0.06 a -0.02 a
8 Market Share -0.00 0.01 a 0.19 a 0.17 a -0.00 a
9 Leverage 0.01 a -0.02 a -0.12 a -0.11 a -0.25 a -0.03 a
10 Cash Flow 0.04 a -0.01 a -0.01 a -0.02 a 0.65 a -0.00 -0.25 a
11 Bribery Mean 0.00 -0.02 a -0.06 a 0.13 a 0.02 a -0.05 a 0.01 a -0.00
12 Bribery Dispersion -0.00 -0.00 -0.16 a -0.03 a 0.02 a -0.05 a 0.00 a -0.01 a 0.57 a
13 Rule of Law 0.03 a 0.06a 0.25a -0.12 a -0.02 a 0.09a -0.01 a 0.02a -0.47a -0.35 a
Note: The Table reports pairwise correlations between all used variables. The definitions of the variables are in
the text and Appendix B. Number of observations is 678,381, non-missing for all variables. The symbols
a
,
b
,
and
c
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
4. Empirical Methodology
The identification of the relation between bribery and firm performance is not
straightforward due to possible endogeneity. Bribery may influence firm performance by
increasing or reducing constraints on operation and growth, while better performing firms
15
may have a greater willingness and ability to pay bribes. This reverse causality can be
further induced by unobservable factors that correlate with both firm performance and
bribery practices, such as managerial talent and firm culture.
In the context of this study, the endogeneity problem is largely reduced for several
reasons. First of all, we control for firm fixed effects that remove time-invariant
unobservable factors that could potentially cause both firm performance and bribing
behavior. The identification in our regression analysis thus comes from within firm variation
over time, and we assume bribery measures to be exogenous. Second, instead of bribing
behavior of individual firms, we employ more aggregated measures  bribery mean and
dispersion in a local market defined by industry, firm-size, and location-size characteristics.
Arguably, an individual firm has a negligible influence on these aggregate measures.
17
This
influence is further decreased when firm performance and bribery measures come from
different independent data sources (Anos-Casero and Udomsaph, 2009).
Nevertheless, in the next section we first compare the estimates identified from
within-firm variation with the estimates identified from within-cluster variation to
demonstrate the reduction of the endogeneity bias. This occurs because average firm
performance within a cluster more likely affects mean bribery, inducing a bias of the
estimates (upward bias if better performing firms are ready to bribe more frequently).
Admittedly, firm fixed effects are not able to eliminate biases due to temporal endogeneity.
17
In view of the difficulty in finding appropriate instruments for bribery measures, the use of industry-
location or industry-location-firm size average measures of bribery or obstacles to firm growth and operation
instead of firm-specific measures is a handy approach to reduce the endogeneity problem in existing research,
which employs cross-sectional data from BEEPS, WBES, or IC (Investment Climate). See, for example,
Dollar et al. (2005), Aterido et al. (2011), and Commander and Svejnar (2011).
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Our empirical specification is a typical growth equation, originally proposed by
Evans (1987), where the dependent variable is the growth rate and the independent variables
are lagged to control for initial conditions.
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yit = 0 + 1Bribery Meanct + 2Bribery Dispersionct + Xit-1 + i + t + Vs + it,
(1)
where yit is the performance measure of firm i at time period t; it is either real sales or labor
productivity growth rates, averaged over three-year periods (1999-2001, 2003-2004, 2005-
2007). Bribery Meanct and Bribery Dispersionct are the mean and standard deviation of the
frequency to pay bribes in cluster c. The coefficients of interest are 1 and 2. Their positive
signs would favor the grease the wheels hypothesis of corruption.
The vector Xit-1 stands for the vector of firm-level control variables. They are
measured at the beginning of each time period (i.e. at 1999, 2002, and 2005), to control for
the initial conditions, and to reduce possible endogeneity between them and firm
performance measures. The full set of control variables is described in Section 3. The term
i removes unobserved firm fixed effects that can create across-time correlation of the
residuals of a given firm (e.g. managerial skill). The term t removes unobserved time fixed
effects that can be responsible for the correlation of the residuals across different firms in a
given year (e.g. aggregate shocks or business cycles). The term s captures unobserved firm-
size fixed effects (micro, small, and medium-large firms) that can lead to the correlation of
the residuals across firms of a given size category due to, e.g., specific regulations attached
to firms of a particular size;
19
and it is the i.i.d. random component. We estimate
specification (1) using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm
18
Similar specifications are also widely used in the literature that studies the effects of privatization, political
connections, and other events on firm performance, see, for example, Hanousek et al. (2007) and Boubakri et
al. (2008).
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We control for firm-size fixed effects, because firm size is included in the criteria defining clusters, and
some firms move from one size category to another over time. The country, location and industry factors from
the criteria are removed when firm fixed effects are taken into account. The exclusion of firm-size fixed
effects, however, does not affect the results.
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level. In addition, we account for influential observations using Cooks distance as the data
for CEE countries are highly volatile.
20
Finally, we are concerned about measurement error in the bribery variables. Under
the assumption of the classical measurement error  it does not correlate with the error from
the regression  the coefficients of interest would be biased towards zero. This assumption
seems plausible as we use two combined independent datasets. In addition, we believe that
the possible measurement error is averaged out in our bribery mean measure; this, however,
may not be the case for bribery dispersion. The retained measurement error, therefore, could
attenuate the estimates.
5. Results and Discussion
5.1. Baseline Results
Table 3 reports the results of the estimation of specification (1). Odd columns present the
results for the dependent variable, real sales growth, and even columns  for labor
productivity growth. In columns IIV we control for time, country, industry, location, and
firm-size fixed effects. In columns VVIII we add firm fixed effects.
Table 3: Baseline results
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Sales Productivity Sales Productivity Sales Productivity Sales Productivity
Bribery Mean -0.039a -0.016a -0.057a -0.033a -0.042a -0.072a -0.096a -0.139a
(0.004) -0.004 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Bribery Dispersion 0.056a 0.054a 0.174a 0.219a
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Total Assets -0.019a 0.003a -0.019a 0.003a -0.075a -0.038a -0.076a -0.040a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Employees -0.260a 0.085a -0.260a 0.084a -0.072a -0.005c -0.070a -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Total Assets Sq. 0.003a -0.002a 0.003a -0.002a 0.003a -0.002a 0.003a -0.002a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employees Sq. 0.017a -0.001a 0.017a -0.001a -0.009a 0.021a -0.009a 0.020a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability 0.009a -0.053a 0.010a -0.053a 0.003 -0.024a 0.001 -0.028a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Market Share -0.046a -0.406a -0.048a -0.407a -0.928a -1.108a -0.916a -1.045a
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.081) (0.085) (0.078) (0.080)
Leverage 0.042a 0.008a 0.042a 0.008a 0.032a 0.040a 0.031a 0.039a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
20
Cooks distance is a measure based on the difference between the regression parameter estimates and
what they become if the i
th
data point is deleted . Observations for which this distance exceeds 4/N are
removed as outliers, where N is the number of observations used in the regression (Cook, 1977).
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Cash Flow 0.126a 0.047a 0.124a 0.048a 0.074a 0.031a 0.076a 0.037a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Time, Country,
Industry, and
Location size FEs
yes yes yes yes - - - -
Firm, Time,
and Firm size FEs
- - - - yes yes yes yes
N observations 653,460 651,849 652,950 651,415 628,239 627,758 627,459 627,067
N group 446,205 446,280 445,678 445,807
R2 adjusted/within 0.081 0.074 0.081 0.074 0.218 0.111 0.224 0.117
Average bribery
mean effect
-1.22% -0.49% -1.79% -1.02% -1.29% -2.22% -2.97% -4.32%
Average bribery
dispersion effect
1.49% 1.45% 4.66% 5.87%
Average total effect -0.30%
c
0.42%
b
1.70%
a
1.55%
a
Note: The Table reports the results of the estimation of specification (1) for two performance measures as
dependent variables: real sales growth and labor productivity growth. All control variables are measured at the
beginning of each time period (i.e., at 1999, 2002, or 2005). The definitions of the variables are in the text and
Appendix B. The average effects are the products of the estimated coefficients on bribery mean and dispersion
and the sample average values of the corresponding variables; the average total effect is the sum of these two
effects. Standard errors shown in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level.
Cooks distance is used to account for influential observation. The symbols a, b, and c denote significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
If better firm performance is generally associated with higher participation in
bribery, then in within-cluster regressions (columns IIV) should be biased upward,
because cluster-level firm performance may more likely affect cluster-level bribery. If lower
performing firms have more incentives to bribe in order to take shortcuts, then the bias
could be downward. Even if we are not certain about the bias direction, controlling for firm
fixed effects should reduce this bias. The coefficient is smaller in columns VVIII
compared to columns IIV, advocating for the lessening of (upward) endogeneity bias, and
the use of firm fixed effects regressions.
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The comparison of columns III with IIIIV and of columns VVI with VIIVIII
also shows that the inclusion of bribery dispersion variable into regressions does not change
the sign or significance of . This permits us to analyze both bribery mean and dispersion
variables together. The bottom of Table 3 shows the average effects of the bribery mean and
dispersion on firm performance as well as their sum.
22
21
In the case of bribery dispersion, in within-cluster regression, its impact on firm growth is also
more diluted than in within-firm regression.
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We compute the average effects as a product of the sample average value of the bribery mean or
bribery dispersion and the corresponding estimated coefficient. For example, in column VII of
Table 3, the average effect of the bribery mean on sales growth is (0.096×0.311)×100% » 2.97%,
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Using the regressions from columns VII and VIII as benchmarks, ceteris paribus,
the increase in bribery mean by its average value is associated with a 3.0% and 4.3%
decrease in corresponding firm performance measures. These numbers are relatively large
since the average real sales growth is 4.6% and the average labor productivity growth is
negative 3.1% in our sample. The results thus show that bribery is a burden for firm
performance, which is consistent with some previous findings at both the micro (Fisman and
Svensson, 2007; De Rosa et al., 2015) and macro level (Mauro, 1995; Aidt et al., 2009).
The estimates of the coefficients on bribery dispersion, in contrast, are positive for
both dependent variables, and highly significant. For a given level of bribery mean in a local
market, the average bribery dispersion effects are 4.7% and 5.9% for the two performance
measures. The sum of the average bribery mean and dispersion effects is positive and equals
1.7% for sales growth and 1.6% for labor productivity growth.
These results suggest that while a higher level of bribery impairs sales and labor
productivity growth, firms grow faster in local environments with a higher dispersion of
individual firm bribes. Hence bribery greases the wheels of doing business for individual
firms, but harms firms collective economic performance. In more dispersed environments,
firms that are more efficient in bribery (but not necessarily inefficient in production)  those
that have more information about greasing the wheels, are discriminated by the public
officials in a mutually beneficial way, with lower costs or higher willingness to bribe 
apparently bribe more frequently. Owing to bribes, they most likely generate higher growth
rates than if they were not to bribe. Their non-bribing (or less frequently bribing)
counterparts must be efficient in production and growth to compete with bribing firms. In
this case, both types of firms are able to generate increasing sales and labor productivity
growth rates in a local market.
where 0.096 is the estimate of the coefficient on the bribery mean and 0.311 is the sample average
of the bribery mean variable.
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In less dispersed local bribery environments, if the number of bribing firms prevails,
negative externality from bribery (such as incentives to induce the bureaucratic burden by
public officials) can slow down growth rates. If the number of non-bribing firms dominates,
then there can be fewer incentives for firms to be efficient and compete aggressively with
occasionally bribing firms.
The results also show that the effects of bribery mean and dispersion are sounder for
labor productivity than for sales growth rates. This suggests that participation in bribery
affects the employment structure of firms. In highly corrupt environments, firms likely
employ a non-optimal (higher) number of workers due to misallocation of talent, in
accordance with Murphy et al. (1991) and Dal Bo and Rossi (2007). It may also be the case
that public officials (or local government), having established a connection with a firm, do
not allow it to dismiss its workers in order to keep high employment figures and more loyal
voters. However, bribing firms that have an opportunity to gain a competitive edge over
their non-bribing counterparts (in more heterogeneous environments) are able to adjust the
employment structure to an optimal level and increase performance.
The results thus show that bribery can work as the grease the wheels instrument,
despite its overall damaging effect. The existence of a certain number of bribing firms in a
local market increases aggregate firm performance, as the positive effect from the bribery
dispersion exceeds the negative effect from the bribery mean. To some extent these findings
are in line with theoretical predictions of Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), Infante and
Smirnova (2009) and De Vaal and Ebben (2011).
The following subsections examine the effect of bribery with respect to the
heterogeneity of firms and environments, to better understand what drives the relation
between bribery and firm performance. The last subsection describes robustness checks.
5.2. Heterogeneity of Firms
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5.2.1. Manufacturing and Service Firms
In our dataset, firms from manufacturing sectors represent only 14.5% of the sample. On
average, they tend to have lower sales growth, higher labor productivity growth, and pay
bribes less often than firms from service sectors.
23
Panel A in Table 4 presents the results of
the estimation of specification (1) for manufacturing, service, and construction firms
separately. In this table, for the sake of space, we present only average bribery mean and
dispersion effects, while the full estimation results are available in the Online Appendix.
The estimated coefficients on bribery mean and dispersion are different for the
manufacturing and services firms.
Higher bribery mean in a local environment significantly reduces the performance of
manufacturing firms, especially the real sales growth. Operating in more bribery
heterogeneous environments does not bring them benefits either (see columns III, Panel A
in Table 4). One explanation of this result is that larger manufacturing firms are more
visible and attractive to corrupt public officials. At the same time size can make these firms
less flexible in responding to the bribery and lessen the capacity to extract benefits in
dispersed local bribery environments. Manufacturing firms also tend to have a larger share
of foreign ownership and exports, which is usually associated with higher management
standards, stricter attitudes against corruption and, perhaps, a poorer ability to deal with it.
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Another explanation for the result may be that our bribery measure does not reflect
well the nature of corruption practices among manufacturing firms. These firms arguably
require fewer permits, licenses, and inspections than do service firms but might depend
more heavily on relationships with customers and supply chains. Their corruption practices,
therefore, might instead consist of kickbacks between businesses.
23
These statistics are available in the Online Appendix.
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Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow us to control for firm ownership structure or export shares.
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Service firms, in contrast to manufacturing, are usually smaller, more flexible, and
likely to interact more often with public officials. Although on average they suffer as well
from a higher bribery mean, they are also able to gain significantly in local markets with
higher bribery dispersion, see columns III-IV in Panel A, Table 4. To a large extent these
service firms belong to wholesale and retail industries as they represent about a half of the
whole sample. Approximately 15% of the sample belongs to the construction industry. The
last two columns in Panel A, Table 4 show that construction firms are able to gain very high
returns in dispersed bribery environments, possibly related to bribery associated with public
construction tenders, building permits, related regulations, etc.
Table 4: Different types of firms
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Sales Productivity Sales Productivity Sales Productivity
Panel A: Manufacturing and service firms
Manufacturing Services Construction
N observations 88 917 88 960 442 567 441 964 96,137 96,402
Average bribery
mean effect
-6.99 a -3.95 a -1.08 a -3.57 a -3.74 a -5.05 a
Average bribery
dispersion effect
-0.68 -2.37 a 3.65 a 6.30 a 10.42 a 7.79 a
Average total effect -7.67
a
-6.32
a
2.57
a
2.73
a
6.68
a
2.74
a
Panel B: By firm size: Micro, small and large firms
210 employees 1149 employees 50+ employees
N observations 291 283 291 513 228 848 228 688 107 719 107 728
Average bribery
mean effect
-0.76 a -2.79 a -3.80 a -3.79 a -6.78 a -5.04 a
Average bribery
dispersion effect
0.87 c 2.83 a 7.55 a 7.20 a 4.11 a 3.83 a
Average total effect 0.11 0.04 3.74
a
3.41
a
-2.67
a
-1.21
a
Note: The Table reports the average bribery mean and dispersion effects (in percentages) after estimation of
specification (1) for different subsamples of firms for two performance measures as dependent variables: real
sales growth and labor productivity growth. The definitions of the variables are in the text and Appendix B.
The average effects are the products of the estimated coefficients on bribery mean and dispersion and the
sample average values of the corresponding variables; the average total effect is the sum of these two effects.
In Panel A firms are divided on subsamples of manufacturing (ISIC codes 1536), services (ISIC codes 51
93) and construction (ISIC code 45) sectors. In panel B firms are divided into subsamples of micro (210
employees), small (1149 employees), and medium and large (more than 50 employees) firms. Standard errors
shown in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Cooks distance is used to
account for influential observation. The symbols a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
5.2.2. Firm Size
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The literature usually documents corruption as a greater obstacle for micro and small firms
than for large firms, and hence it impedes the performance of smaller firms more (e.g., Beck
et al., 2005; Aterido et al., 2011). This is explained, for example, by the fact that smaller
firms have weaker bargaining power and less influence on public officials. In the present
study, however, bribery measures the frequency of paying bribes to get things done and
may not reflect corruption as an obstacle. We observe that the bribery mean increases with
firm size, hence, we do not expect the same results as the cited literature suggests.
Panel B in Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of specification (1) for three
subsamples of micro, small, and medium and large firms. The signs of the coefficients on
bribery mean and dispersion are the same as in the case for the whole sample; the
magnitudes, however, are different for the three subsamples. It turns out that the growth
rates of micro firms are the least affected by bribery, larger firms suffer the most from a
higher bribery mean, and small firms are able to extract the greatest benefits in more
heterogeneous local environments.
One explanation of this finding is that firms of different size category carry different
regulatory burden. These differences are usually designed to promote the growth and
development of small businesses and encourage entrepreneurship (World Bank, 2004;
European Commission, 2011). Smaller (micro) firms are often required to comply with
softer regulatory standards such as reporting and keeping records for inspections. They may
also be exempted from some taxes, or have lower tax rates (Gauthier and Goyette, 2014).
Further, smaller amounts of bribes can be extracted from firms with a smaller number of
employees and turnover.
5.3. Heterogeneity of Environments
5.3.1. Countries Institutional Environments
24
Although the countries from the CEE region underwent transition at approximately the same
time, they are heterogeneous with respect to the quality of formal and informal institutions,
as well as their overall corruption levels (Figures A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A). Not
surprisingly, countries that entered the European Union in 2004 (Slovenia, Hungary, Poland,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) tend to have less corruption,
while Russia and Ukraine appear to be the most corrupt according to the Control of
Corruption indicator. In this section we analyze how local bribery environments affect firm
performance depending on the level of countries institutional strength.
We use the rule of law indicator from the WGI database to proxy for the strength of
countries institutions. It captures the incidence of crime, effectiveness of the judiciary,
enforcement of contracts, and property rights protection.25 We rescale this indicator to a
variable that ranges from 0 to 1, where higher values stand for a stronger rule of law. We
augment the specification (1) with interaction terms between rule of law and bribery
measures to see how country institutions are associated with the bribery  firm performance
relationship.
Columns I-II in Table 5 report the coefficients of interest from the estimation of
these specifications and Figure A.3 in Appendix A depicts the average bribery mean and
dispersion effects for different values of the rule of law indicator.26 The results suggest that
in countries with stronger institutions the negative impact of the bribery mean is more
pronounced. In countries with the weakest rule of law indicator, such as in Serbia between
1999 and 2001, the effect is positive, but not significant. The improvement of institutions
also increases growth gains from the bribery dispersion in local markets. Hence, a higher
probability of being caught and stricter law enforcements make bribery more detrimental,
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The rule of law indicator is a widely used institutional quality measure, see, for example, Dreher et al.
(2014), and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014). We acknowledge that this indicator can correlate with
other country factors such as human capital, economic development or level of democracy; and these other
factors can drive our results. However, since the correlation between rule of law and these factors is likely
high, we believe that the indicator captures well the aggregate institutional environments.
26
Full results are available in the Online Appendix.
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while the possibility of discriminating amongst firms brings higher benefits. Our findings
signal that, in countries with weaker institutions, bribery more often greases the wheels of
doing business. At the same time higher pervasiveness of corruption provides fewer benefits
to firms in more bribery heterogeneous environments. These results are in line with the
country-level studies of Aidt et al. (2008) and Meon and Weill (2010). Aidt et al. (2008)
show theoretically and empirically that, in countries with good institutions, corruption can
be detrimental to economic growth, while in countries with bad institutions, corruption does
not impact growth. They explain it by endogeneity and self-reinforcement of growth and
corruption, when higher growth leads to lower corruption which, in turn, improves growth.
Meon and Weill (2010) demonstrate that corruption improves aggregate efficiency in
countries with better governance quality. Our findings, however, contradict the empirical
firm-level evidence of De Rosa et al. (2015) showing that bribery is more harmful in non-
EU countries. The differences might come from the fact that we use improved data and
methodology in the current paper.
Table 5: Heterogeneity of countries and local environments
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Sales Productivity Sales Productivity
Bribery Mean 0.010 0.003 -0.271 a -0.291 a
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Bribery Mean* -0.284*** -0.441***
Rule of Law (0.020) (0.020)
Bribery Dispersion 0.110*** 0.203*** -0.040 a 0.033 b
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
Bribery Dispersion* 0.202*** 0.081***
Rule of Law (0.027) (0.027)
Rule of Law -0.822*** -0.181***
(0.020) (0.019)
Bribery Mean* 0.688 a 0.588 a
Bribery Dispersion (0.040) (0.040)
N observations 627,634 626,869 627,546 626,995
N group 446,004 445,806 445,726 445,773
R2 within 0.240 0.127 0.225 0.119
Note: The Table reports the results of the estimation of augmented specification (1) for two performance
measures as dependent variables: real sales growth and labor productivity growth. The definitions of the
variables are in the text and Appendix B. In columns I-II, specification (1) includes bribery mean and
dispersion variables interacted with the rule of law indicator. In columns III-IV, specification (1) includes
interaction between bribery mean and dispersion variables. Standard errors shown in parentheses are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Cooks distance is used to account for influential observation.
The symbols
a
,
b
, and
c
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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5.3.2. Local bribery environments
Our baseline results show that, ceteris paribus, a higher bribery mean (dispersion) leads to
lower (higher) economic performance of firms. In this subsection, we examine the
interaction between these two characteristics of local bribery environments. In particular, we
are interested in how the bribery mean affects firm growth rates depending on the extent of
bribery dispersion.
Columns III-IV in Table 5 offer the results of estimation for specification (1), in
which the interaction term between the bribery mean and dispersion is included. The
coefficient on the interaction term is positive, large and significant. This implies that firms
more likely increase their growth rates if they operate in local bribery environments, in
which corruption stakes and the opportunities to gain from corruption are higher. Figure A.4
in Appendix A shows average bribery effects on sales and productivity growth rates for the
range of bribery dispersion values. When bribery dispersion exceeds 0.4, these effects
become positive. This value of bribery dispersion falls into the 95th percentile of the sample
distribution. If the bribery dispersion equals zero and the bribery mean increases by its
sample mean value, then firms growth decreases to the negative rates, -8% and -9% for
sales and labor productivity correspondingly. In the environments where all firms uniformly
participate in bribery practices, corruption is extremely harmful.
5.4. Robustness Checks
In this section we describe robustness checks which we conduct to verify the stability of our
results. The complete estimation results are available in the Online Appendix.
As a first robustness check we use bribery measures constructed as dummy variables
from the original frequency of paying bribes. The first measure takes value one if firms
report that they bribe public officials sometimes, frequently, usually, or always to get
things done, and zero otherwise, as in De Rosa et al. (2015). The second measure takes
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value one if firms report that they bribe seldom, sometimes, frequently, usually, or always,
and zero if never. These measures are averaged within clusters. The bribery dispersion
variable is computed as before. The estimates of the coefficients of interest in the
regressions with new bribery measures remain similar to those from baseline results; only
their magnitudes are slightly smaller. The results therefore are not influenced by the
construction of the bribery mean measure.
Although the bribery measure is consistently defined across three waves of BEEPS,
the structure of the questionnaire and stratification of surveyed firms were slightly changed
in the last wave. In addition, the number of firms in the Amadeus database increases over
time. To see if these changes impact the results, we estimate specification (1) separately for
the first and second, and for the second and third time periods. In addition, we estimate
specification (1) separately for Russia and Ukraine only, and for the rest of the countries
excluding Russia and Ukraine, since these are the most corrupt and represent about half of
the whole sample. Again, the estimates confirm that sample restrictions do not affect the
main outcome.
To ensure a stable structure of BEEPS within clusters, rather than unconditional
averaging of the bribery measure from BEEPS, we compute the bribery mean variable
keeping constant such firm characteristics as foreign ownership, export, and firm age. We
then use this conditional bribery mean variable to estimate specification (1). The bribery
dispersion variable, meantime, remains the same. The main results stay qualitatively the
same. Structuring the BEEPS and Amadeus data within clusters in another way, we compute
the bribery mean and dispersion variables using the bribery measure from BEEPS
multiplied by the proportions of young and old firms within corresponding clusters from
Amadeus. When we use these weighted measures to estimate specification (1), the
coefficients of interest only increased in absolute values.
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The main analysis assumes growth rates averaged over three years and control
variables measured at the beginnings of the three-year periods. As a robustness check we
estimate specification (1) on yearly data (nine years in total) with lagged control variables,
using two methods. First, we use conventional firm, firm-size and time-fixed effects
estimation as before. Second, we include a lag of the dependent variable among the
explanatory variables to control for autocorrelation in residuals and apply Arellano and
Bonds (1991) dynamic panel data estimation technique.
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The coefficients of interest are
not qualitatively different from the main results, meaning that neither the data structure nor
possible autocorrelation drive the results.
In the main analysis we require each cluster to have no fewer than four observations
in order to compute bribery mean and dispersion. Obviously, the higher the number of
observations in a cluster, the better is the measurement accuracy of these variables.
Therefore, we also conducted the analysis under a constraint of no fewer than three
observations and no fewer than five observations in each cluster. The results are
qualitatively the same. The magnitudes of the coefficients of interest, however, become
larger when bribery mean and dispersion are computed more accurately.
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Given that we can only use location size, but not region in the criteria defining
clusters, we check if the results remain the same when location size is excluded from the
criteria. First, we estimate specification (1) for the subsample of firms located in the capitals
of countries, since they are the only cities exactly identified in BEEPS and Amadeus.
Second, we estimate specification (1) on the dataset when location size is omitted from the
criteria. Remarkably, the results remain qualitatively the same in both cases.
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In particular, we estimate specification (1) in first differences and use the second lags of independent
variables (except for the bribery mean and dispersion, since they do not change across the three year periods)
as instruments. Difference-GMM estimation performs better than system-GMM estimation. Although the latter
preserves the relationship between firm performance and bribery measures, it does not remove AR(2)
correlation in the data which could indicate problems with the specification of the system of equations.
Therefore we report only the results of difference-GMM estimation.
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This fact also confirms that possible measurement error in our bribery variables could lead to attenuation of
the estimates.
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In our bribery mean variable, the measurement error and perception bias are likely
reduced due to averaging out. The aggregation, however, does not solve the problem of
missing data. About 10% of the sample in BEEPS does not report frequency of bribing; this,
however, is the smallest number relative to other questions about corruption. To check
whether missing values affect the results, we estimate specification (1) putting lower
weights on clusters with a higher number of missing observations. The weight is equal to
the ratio of the number of non-missing values to the total number of observations in a
cluster. The estimated coefficients of interest are nearly identical to those from the main
analysis, ruling out the problem of missing data in the original bribery measure.
For another robustness check, we do not account for influential outliers using Cooks
distance; we change the rule for defining outliers from 1% of the top and bottom of
distribution to 5%, and do not use data imputation (see Online Appendix). The estimates of
the coefficients of interest remain virtually the same as before and, therefore, robust to the
definition of outliers and the imputation procedure. The stricter rule for outliers accounting,
though, slightly increases the magnitudes of the coefficients on the bribery mean and
dispersion and doubles the overall fit of the regressions.
Finally, in specification (1) we add variables that measure different obstacles to
firms operation and growth obtained from BEEPS. These measures are averaged within our
clusters in the same way as the frequency of bribery. By including these obstacles we check
whether the bribery mean and dispersion explain the participation of firms in bribes, but not
other phenomena. We analyze the cases for corruption, tax administration, and obstacles in
obtaining business licenses and permits. The inclusion of these obstacles into the
specification does not change the significance and signs of the main results.
6. Conclusion
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This study empirically examines the relationship between local bribery environments and
firm performance in Central and Eastern European countries. It provides an explanation for
divergent consequences of bureaucratic corruption found in previous research.
To overcome the data and methodological limitations of existing empirical literature
on bureaucratic corruption and firm performance, we combine large and reliable firm
financial data from the Amadeus database with firm bribery practices from BEEPS. We
define local markets by clusters of firms sharing the same country, industry, firm size and
location size characteristics. Within those clusters we compute the mean and standard
deviation of the frequency of paying bribes to public officials to get things done, and
assign them to each firm from the Amadeus database belonging to the same cluster. These
two statistics describe a local bribery environment: the equilibrium level of bureaucratic
corruption in a local market, and bribing behavior of firms shaped by firms willingness to
bribe, discretionary power of public officials to extract bribes, and uncertainty about
environments. Accounting for firm-level fixed effects, focus on local bribery environments
and the use of two independent data sources help us mitigate the endogeneity concerns
between bribery and firm performance measures.
Exploring within-firm variation, the results suggest that a higher bribery mean in a
local market retards both real sales and labor productivity growth. The increase in the
bribery mean by its average sample value is associated with about a 3.0% and 4.3%
decrease in corresponding firm performance measures. This outcome complements some of
the existing empirical research on the consequences of corruption at the macro- and micro-
levels. We also find that conditional on a given level of bureaucratic corruption, higher
bribery dispersion facilitates firm performance. The average bribery dispersion effects are
positive and equal to 4.7% and 5.9% for the two performance measures, so that the trade-
offs between bribery mean and dispersion are positive, too. These results are robust to
various specification checks and sample restrictions.
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Our findings suggest that at least some bribing firms receive preferential treatments
from public officials, while non-bribing firms seem to be efficient in production and growth
in more dispersed bribery environments. The presence of a certain number of bribing firms
in a local market increases aggregate performance, which is in line with Acemoglu and
Verdier (2000), Infante and Smirnova (2009) and De Vaal and Ebben (2011). High
dispersion of individual firm bribes in some environments can thus explain the persistence
of corruption and advocate the grease the wheels hypothesis.
In addition, we find that firms are more likely to increase their growth rates in the
environments with both higher bribery mean and higher dispersion. The main results of the
paper hold most strongly for services and construction firms. The effects of a local bribery
environment appear to be more important for firms with more than 10 employees. The
impact of bribery mean and dispersion on firm performance also seems to be less sound in
countries with weaker institutions.
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Appendix A: Figures
Figure A.1: The Control of Corruption indicator
Note: The Figure shows the variation of the Control of Corruption indicator across countries and time
periods. For each time period the average value over three years is taken. Higher values stand for lower
overall corruption levels.
Figure A.2: Bribery mean
Note: The Figure shows the variation of the bribery mean constructed from BEEPS (before linking it to firm
financial data from Amadeus) across countries and time periods. Spikes represent 95 percent confidence
intervals. Higher values indicate a higher frequency of bribing.
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Figure A.3: Average bribery mean and dispersion effects depending on countriess
institutions
Note: The Figure shows average bribery mean and dispersion effects depending on different values of the rule
of law indicator for sales and labor productivity growth rates. Higher values of rule of law correspond to
stronger institutions.
Figure A.4: Average bribery mean effects depending on bribery dispersion
Note: The Figure shows average bribery mean effects depending on different values of the bribery dispersion
for sales and labor productivity growth rates.
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Appendix B: Definitions of variables
Name Definition and Source
Bribery Mean
Mean bribery level in a local environment, computed as the average of
frequency of bribing (scaled to [0, 1] variable) within a cluster defined by
country, time period, industry, firm size, and location size. Source:
BEEPS.
Bribery
Dispersion
Dispersion of individual firm bribes in a local environment, computed as
the standard deviation of frequency of bribing (scaled to [0, 1] variable)
within a cluster defined by country, time period, industry, firm size, and
location size. Source: BEEPS.
Sales Growth
First difference of logarithms of operational revenue (in USD, 2000
prices), averaged over three-year time periods. Source: Amadeus.
Labor
Productivity
Growth
First difference of logarithms of operational revenue (in USD, 2000
prices) over number of employees, averaged over three-year time periods.
Source: Amadeus.
Total Assets Logarithm of total assets. Source: Amadeus.
Total Assets
Squared
Logarithm of total assets squared. Source: Amadeus.
Employees Logarithm of number of employees. Source: Amadeus.
Employees
Squared
Logarithm of number of employees squared. Source: Amadeus.
Profitability
EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) over total assets. Source:
Amadeus
Market Share
Operational revenue of a firm divided by the total operational revenue of
an industry (defined at the four-digit level). Source: Amadeus.
Leverage
Total debt (current liabilities plus long term debt) over total assets.
Source: Amadeus.
Cash Flow Cash flow over total assets. Source: Amadeus.
Control of
Corruption
Indicator that shows overall level of corruption in a country. Higher
values stand for lower corruption levels. Source: Worldwide Governance
Indicators Database, World Bank.
Rule of Law
Indicator that shows overall quality of institutions in a country. Original
indicator is a scaled to [0, 1] variable. Higher values stand for stronger
institutions. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators Database, World
Bank.
